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PRODUCT LIABILITY IN MARYLAND REVISITED
Edward S. Digges, Jr.t
The author discusses and compares the various theories of
recovery available in a product liability case. He concludes
that merger of the various theories into a single basic
product cause of action might be procedurally beneficial.
Various defenses available in product litigation, as well as
procedures for invoking indemnity and contribution, are
also discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the issue of this Law Review devoted to product liability,1
the Court of Appeals of Maryland has confirmed its previously
intimated pro-consumer stance on the subject.2 Strict liability in tort
has been added to the arsenal of recovery theories,3 and warranty
has been stripped of some technical hurdles. 4 The recent product
liability decisions5 bring Maryland into step with modern thought
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1. Product Liability Law Symposium, 5 U. BALT. L. REV. 1-151 (1975).
2. Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975); Giant Food,
Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d 1 (1975); Moran
v. Fabrege, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v.
Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974).
3. Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976). The suit was
before the Court of Appeals of Maryland on a question certified by the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland, Civil Action No. M75-1560.
The case involved an action brought by an automobile dealership service writer
who was injured when the vehicle he was test driving left the highway and
crashed into a tree. The complaint contained allegations that the acceleration
mechanism of the vehicle became stuck due to a latent defect in either the
accelerator, the carburetor, or the motor mounts, and thereby caused the
automobile to accelerate suddenly and uncontrollably to a high rate of speed. See
generally 6 U. BALT. L. REV. 295, 296 (1977).
4. Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976) (cause of action
for loss of consortium by third party beneficiary premised on breach of Uniform
Commercial Code warranties provided in Sections 2-313 to -315 via Section
2-318 allowed if proved on remand); Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md.
304, 363 A.2d 460 (1976) (third party beneficiary of Uniform Commercial Code
warranties provided in Section 2-313 to -315, pursuant to Section 2-318, not
required to give "Notice" prescribed in Section 2-607(3)(a) when suing for breach
of enumerated warranties).
5. Eaton Corp. v. Wright, 281 Md. 80, 375 A.2d 1122 (197); Mattos, Inc. v. Hash, 279
Md. 371, 368 A.2d 993 (1977); Burton v. Artery Co., 279 Md. 94, 367 A.2d 935
(1977); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976); Frericks
v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 304, 363 A.2d 460 (1976); Frericks v. General
Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975); Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d 1 (1975); Moran v. Fabrege, Inc.,
273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md.
201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974).
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on this subject. At the same time, these decisions raise a variety of
new issues for the practitioner. It is the intent of this article to
discuss many of these issues in an effort to guide the practitioner as
he deals with this rapidly developing area of the law.
Each of the three commonly used theoretical vehicles for
recovery in product litigation - negligence, breach of warranty and
strict liability - is now available to a product plaintiff.6 Distinguish-
ing characteristics, as well as common elements of the various
theories must be well understood. To recover under any theory,
defect, attribution, and causation must be proved. A discussion of
these elements follows a highlighting of the distinctive features of
the three commonly employed theories of recovery. Also included is a
practitioner's guide to defenses frequently used in product liability
actions, and a discussion of indemnity and contribution within the
product liability context.
II. THREE CAUSES OF ACTION
A. Negligence
Basic tort law requires that a cause of action founded upon
negligence allege a duty requiring conformity to a certain standard
of conduct for the protection of others against unreasonable risk, a
failure to conform to the prescribed standard, and a causal
relationship between the conduct and a resulting injury. 7 From a
plaintiffs viewpoint, negligence is the most difficult theory of
recovery because a duty of care does not arise unless the plaintiff
6. Another possible theory of recovery, deceit, rarely proves viable as a basis for
recovery in a product case because the theory of deceit necessarily focuses on the
distinction between negligent misrepresentation and fraud. A representation
made without knowledge of its truth or falsity, for the purpose of inducing a sale,
is a mere negligent misrepresentation, while a representation made with
knowledge of its falsity, for the purpose of inducing a sale, amounts to a fraud.
Appel v. Hupfield, 198 Md. 374, 84 A.2d 94 (1951); Lustine Chevrolet v. Cadeaux,
19 Md. App. 30, 308 A.2d 747 (1973). Most jurisdictions, including Maryland,
recognize a clear distinction between representation of past or existing fact and
expression of opinion as to future performance; fraud may not be based on
statements which are promissory in nature. Appel v. Hupfield, 198 Md. at 379, 84
A.2d at 95-96; cf. King v. O'Reilly Motor Cu., 16 Ariz. App. 518, 494 P.2d 718
(1972) (condition of demonstrator car represented "as good as new"). In short,
failure to fulfill a promise is merely a breach of contract which must be enforced,
if at all, by an action on the contract. Levin v. Singer, 227 Md. 47, 175 A.2d 423
(1961). Of course, an action for deceit may be premised upon an active
concealment, id. at 64, 175 A.2d at 432.
Occasionally, a plaintiff in a product case may have available a statutory
cause of action, i.e., a private action for violation of the Consumer Product Safety
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051 to -2081, or the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2301 to -2401. These laws prescribe the prerequisites to such an action and the
available remedies.
7. See W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 143 (4th ed. 1971).
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can show that the defendant knew or should have known that his
product was dangerous.
8
Proof of negligence may be inferred under certain circumstances.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence which creates a
rebuttable preseumption of a defendant's negligence. The presump-
tion arises when the plaintiff proves that the injury-causing
instrumentality was under the exclusive control of the defendant at
the time of injury, and that the injury was such that it would not
have happened if those who had management or control had used
proper care.9 Product cases found ripe for the application of res ipsa
loquitur generally have been confined for definitional reasons to
situations involving adulterated sealed food products and capped
beverages and situations involving exploding containers when there
is proof of proper handling subsequent to the defendant's relinquish-
ing control. 10 The elemental hurdle, usually precluding use of the
"res ipsa doctrine" in routine product litigation, is the "exclusivity of
control" requirement.1' Strict adherence to the rule that the injury-
producing object must have been within the exclusive management
and control of the defendant at the time of the accident defeats
recovery in many cases.
12
The Maryland Court of Appeals' trilogy of exploding container
cases, Joffre v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale,13 Leikach v. Royal Crown
Bottling Company,14 and Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola
Bottling Company,15 illustrates the historical development of the res
ipsa doctrine in Maryland, and provides a readily accessible review
of the nationwide library of similar cases. The trilogy also exhibits a
trend-setting approach favorable to claimants. 6 The court's early
8. Wooley v. Ubelhor, 239 Md. 318, 325, 211 A.2d 302, 305-06 (1965); Braun v. Ford
Motor Co., 32 Md. App. 545, 555, 363 A.2d 562, 568 (1976).
9. See Munzert v. American Stores, Inc., 232 Md. 97, 192 A.2d 59 (1963); Dageforde
v. Potomac Edison Co., 35 Md. App. 37, 369 A.2d 93 (1977). See generally 9
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2509(A), at 3556-57 (2d ed. 1915).
10. See Leikach v. Royal Crown, 261 Md. 541, 276 A.2d 81 (1971); Joffre v. Canada
Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 222 Md. 1, 158 A.2d 631 (1960). The reason res ipsa is
normally confined to such situations is because the "exclusivity of control"
requirement is more easily met.
11. See, e.g., Undeck v. Consumer's Discount Supermarket, Inc., 29 Md. App. 444, 349
A.2d 635 (1975) (directed verdicts for distributor and retailer on failure of
evidence to satisfy attribution of alleged latent defect to them).
12. See 58 AM. JUR. Negligence §496 n.15 (1971).
13. 222 Md. 1, 158 A.2d 631 (1960).
14. 261 Md. 541, 276 A.2d 81 (1971).
15. 273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d 1 (1975).
16. The Court of Appeals of Maryland liberally interpreted the term "sale" within
the context of a warranty action involving the self-service establishment. Giant
Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d 1 (1975).
Giant Food has been favorably reviewed in two recent extra-jurisdictional
opinions. See Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 138 Ga. App. 31, 225 S.E.2d 691
(1976); Barker v. Allied Supermarket, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 6 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976).
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comment on the subject in Joffre, evidenced a strict adherence to the
"exclusivity of control" requirement. The court denied recovery for
an injury caused by an exploding beverage bottle because the
plaintiff failed to disprove the possibility that the negligence of
another had intervened and caused the injury.17 In Leikach and
Giant Food, however, the court approved application of res ipsa in
similar situations, holding proof of an injury caused by an exploding
container, together with proof of proper handling subsequent to the
defendant's relinquishment of control, sufficient.', In neither case
was the plaintiff put to the insurmountable task of accounting for
every moment of the bottle's existence but was required only to prove
general care in handling the bottle subsequent to the defendant's
relinquishment of control.19 If a litigant's case happens to fall within
the well-defined factual limits of Leikach and Sheeskin, his recovery
route will have few of the usual stumbling blocks.
The routine negligence approach often fails because a product
defendant's duty is discharged if his product functions properly and
its functioning creates no peril unknown to the user.20 This concept
barring recovery for injuries caused by a known danger is labelled
the "patent danger doctrine," or the "latent-patent rule."' 2' The New
York case of Campo v. Scofield22 is viewed as the rule's decisional
genesis. In Maryland, the rule has been openly considered and
followed, 23 despite much contemporaneous extrajurisdictional criti-
cism. 24 The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in the first of its recent
17. Joffre v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 222 Md. 1, 10, 158 A.2d 631, 636 (1960).
18. Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592, 597-99, 332
A.2d 1, 4-6 (1975); Leikach v. Royal Crown, 261 Md. 541, 547-50, 276 A.2d 81,
84-86 (1971).
19. Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592, 597-99, 332
A.2d 1, 4-6 (1975); Leikach v. Royal Crown, 261 Md. 541, 547-50, 276 A.2d 81,
84-86 (1971).
20. Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975) (failure to place warning
as to flammability on cologne bottle actionable negligence when plaintiff burned
while pouring cologne on lit candle; peril not known to user).
21. See Katz v. Arundel-Brooks Concrete Corp., 220 Md. 200, 151 A.2d 731 (1959).
22. 301 N.Y. 468, 471, 95 N.E.2d 802, 804 (1950) (injury alleged to have occurred
because of absence of guard or stopping device on onion topping machine).
23. Patten v. Logemann Bros. Co., 263 Md. 364, 368-70, 283 A.2d 567, 569-70 (1971)
(injury alleged to have occurred because of absence of a mesh or guard over
lubrication hold on side of paper baling machine); Blakenship v. Morrison
Machine Co., 255 Md. 241, 245-46, 257 A.2d 430, 431-33 (1969) (injury alleged to
have occurred because of absence of protective guards and shields and automatic
shutoff switch on sanforizing cloth machine); Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
253 Md. 282, 292-95, 252 A.2d 855, 862-63 (1969) (injury alleged to have occurred
because of absence of safety shield surrounding blade of power lawn mower).
24. See Brandon v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 342 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1965); Campbell v.
Siever, 253 Minn. 257, 91 N.W.2d 474 (1958); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44
N.J. 70, 81, 207 A.2d 314, 320 (1965).
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wave of product liability decisions, Volkswagen of America, Inc. v.
Young, 25 acknowledged the rule's continued existence. 26
In recent years, however, various courts have reexamined the
underlying policy for this rule, and the concept has undergone some
substantial erosion, 27 especially in the context of industrial acci-
dents. Moreover, the Campo court has now reversed itself, holding
that the obviousness of the danger should reflect only on the issue of
contributory negligence and should not operate to bar an action for
negligence:
28
Campo suffers from its rigidity in precluding recovery
whenever it is demonstrated that the defect was patent. Its
unwavering view produces harsh results in view of the
difficulties in our mechanized way of life to fully perceive the
scope of danger, which may ultimately be found by a court
to be apparent in manufactured goods as a matter of
law. . . . Apace with advanced technology, a relaxation of
the Campo stringency is advisable. 29
It would appear that the doctrine is now ripe for reexamination
in this jurisdiction. Application of the doctrine amounts to an
assumption of risk defense as a matter of law without any proof
requirement that plaintiff subjectively appreciated a known dan-
ger,30 a result which seems offensive to a recent court of appeals
pronouncement that assumption of risk is ordinarily a defense
requiring trier of fact consideration. 3' From a policy viewpoint, the
opinion of the Washington State Appellate Court in Palmer v.
25. 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974). In Young, fatal injuries were suffered in a rear-
end collision as a result of decedent being thrown into a rear passenger
compartment of his vehicle, when the seat *assembly was torn from the floor.
Plaintiff contended that the seat assembly was unreasonably susceptible to
separation from the floor upon collision, and that the rear compartment
structures were unreasonably dangerous in the event of collision.
26. Id. at 216, 321 A.2d at 744.
27. Orfield v. Int'l Harvester Co., 535 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1976); Collins v. Ridge Tool
Co., 520 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1975); Beloit v. Harrell, 339 So. 2d 992 (Ala. 1976);
Byrns v. Riddel, Inc., 113 Ariz. 264, 550 P.2d 1065 (1976); Blaw-Knox Food &
Chemical Equip. Corp. v. Holmes, 348 So. 2d 604 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Casey
v. Gifford Wood Co., 61 Mich. App. 208, 232 N.W.2d 360 (1976).
28. Micallef v. Miehle Co., D. of Miehle-Gross Dexter, 39 N.Y.2d 37, 348 N.E.2d 571
(1976) (operator of photo off-set press machine injured when hands caught and
pulled into press while attempting to remove foreign particle from face of
printing plate while press, which had no protector guards, in operation; held not
barred by Campo doctrine).
29. Id. at 385, 348 N.E.2d at 577.
30. See Rheingold, Expanding Liability of the Product Supplier: A Primer, 2
HOFSTRA L. REV. 521, 541 (1974).
31. Hooper v. Mougin, 263 Md. 630, 636, 284 A.2d 236, 238 (1971) (shooting injury
caused by negligent hunter unsuccessfully defended on grounds of plaintiffs
contributory negligence or assumption of risk).
1977]
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Massey-Ferguson, Inc.,3 2 seems to be more consistent with the
Maryland Court of Appeals' recent product decisions: "The manufac-
turer of the obviously defective product ought not to escape because
the product was obviously a bad one. The law, we think, ought to
discourage misdesign rather than encouraging it in its obvious
form."
33
As the Court of Appeals of New York explained in reversing
Campo, the obviousness of a danger should remain a relevant
consideration with respect to ultimate responsibility despite renunci-
ation of the patent danger doctrine:
As now enunciated, the patent-danger doctrine should not,
in and of itself, prevent a plaintiff from establishing his
case. That does not mean, however, that the obviousness of
the danger as a factor in the ultimate injury is thereby
eliminated. . . . Rather, the openness and obviousness of
the danger should be available to the defendant on the issue
of whether plaintiff exercised that degree of reasonable care
as was required under the circumstances.
34
B. Warranty
The "Sales" title of the Uniform Commercial Code3 5 provides a
comprehensive risk-apportioning scheme principally focusing on
commercial transactions, but also providing remedies for personal
injuries caused by defective products. The code provides for three
types of warranties, each of which may provide the basis for a
personal injury action: express warranty, 3 implied warranty of
merchantability, 37 and implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose.3 8
Regardless of the type of warranty in issue, a personal injury
plaintiff must show not only the existence of the warranty, but also
that the warranty was broken and that the breach was the
32. 3 Wash. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713 (1970) (plaintiff sued manufacturer of hay baler
for injuries sustained while adjusting a drawbar).
33. Id. at 517, 476 P.2d at 719 (emphasis added).
34. Micallef v. Miehle Co., D. of Miehle-Gross Dexter, 39 N.Y.2d 376, 387, 348 N.E.2d
571, 578 (1976). In Bexiga v. Havir Mfg, Co., 60 N.J. 402, 412, 290 A.2d 281, 286
(1972), the defendant asserted that the plaintiffs act of placing his hand under
the ram of a punch press while at the same time depressing the foot pedal was
negligent. The court held, however, that the defendant was strictly liable for its
failure to install a safety device which would have precluded the possibility of
this very injury. The court stated:
It would be anomalous to hold that defendant has a duty to install safety
devices but a breach of that duty results in no liability for the very injury
the duty was meant to protect against.
35. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. §§ 2-101 to -725 (1975).
36. Id. § 2-313.
37. Id. § 2-314.
38. Id. § 2-315.
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proximate cause of the loss sustained.39 The express warranty
premise is used frequently as a theory for recovery, as is the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, but the implied
warranty of merchantability is the most successful.
40
As useful as warranty actions have shown themselves to be,
strict liability in tort gained acceptance due to a view taken by
courts and commentators that the contractual nature of the
warranty remedy failed adequately to define a manufacturer's
liability to those injured by his defective products. The rules defining
and governing warranties were designed to deal with commercial
transactions, and were considered ill-suited for personal injury
product litigation. 41 The Maryland Court of Appeals has now
adopted the most effective vehicle for recovery - strict liability in
tort.42 The characteristics which distinguish strict liability from
warranty actions are (1) a different limitations period 43 and (2) a
prerequisite of notice to the seller 44 in a buyer's suit based on
warranty.
C. Strict Liability
In Phipps v. General Motors Corp.45 the Maryland Court of
Appeals applied the rule of strict liability expressed in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. 46 Strict liability, like warranty
39. Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592, 608-09, 332
A.2d 1, 10 (1975); Undeck v. Consumer's Discount Supermarket, Inc., 29 Md. App.
444, 349 A.2d 635 (1975).
40. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 97 (4th ed. 1971).
41. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962). See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
42. Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976). See generally 6
U. BALT. L. REV. 295 (1977).
43. The cause of action for strict liability in tort, like a negligence action, will accrue
on the date of injury and is subject to the state's general statute of limitations.
Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 350, 363 A.2d 955, 962 (1976). On
the other hand, the Uniform Commercial Code warranties are subject to the
limitations provided in § 2-725 of the Maryland Commercial Code, which
prescribes a four-year limitations period that commences on the date of a
product's sale. See Burton v. Artery Co., 279 Md. 94, 99, 367 A.2d 935, 938 (1977);
Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 349-50, 363 A.2d 955, 962 (1976);
Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 304, 316, 363 A.2d 460, 466 (1976).
44. Mattos, Inc. v. Hash, 279 Md. 371, 368 A.2d 993 (1977); Frericks v. General
Motors Corp., 278 Md. 304, 363 A.2d 460 (1976).
45. 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976). See generally 6 U. BALT. L. REV. 295 (1977).
46. Section 402A provides:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasona-
bly dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if




and unlike negligence, focuses on the product itself rather than on
the conduct of those in the distributive chain.4 7 This difference in
focus is the crucial distinction between strict liability and warranty
on the one hand, and the third theory of recovery, negligence on the
other. Thus, the seller in a warranty or strict liability context is
effectively the guarantor of his product's safety. His liability is not,
however, the absolute liability of an insurer.48 Liability hinges on
the existence of a defect that makes the product "unreasonably
dangerous" 49 for its intended use in the case of strict liability
actions, and on some defect rendering the product unmerchantable
in the case of warranty actions. The determination of whether a
product is unsafe for its. intended use or is unmerchantable involves
nothing more than a societal value judgment in many cases.s°
Imposition of the "unreasonably dangerous" standard in strict
liability actions represents an attempt by the courts to enunciate
society's expectations of -product safety in a manner that will allow
an objective determination of a seller's liability for product-related
injuries; the code's "merchantability" standard is an attempt to
reach a similar goal within a commercial framework. Those closely
connected with the subject matter realize the need for an objective
standard of liability in product litigation in order to maintain a
proper balance between the competing interests of seller and
consumer. Without such a standard, a jury is left with little more
than its intuitive understanding of product safety requirements with
which to evaluate the condition of a product.5 '
The basic elements of strict liability are (1) sale of a product (2)
in a defective condition (3) which is unreasonably dangerous (4)
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
47. Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 344, 363 A.2d 955, 958 (1976).
48. If it were, a plaintiff would need only to prove that the product was an actual
cause in producing his injury. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for
Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 826 (1973). Comment k of § 402A states that the seller
is not liable for injuries caused by unavoidably unsafe products.
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
50. After all, the reasons for imposing liability are societal in nature: (1) the public
interest in human life and health; (2) the invitations and solicitations of the
distributive chain to purchase the product; and (3) the justice of imposing the loss
on the distributive chain member who created the risk and reaped the profit by
placing the product in the stream of commerce. See Suvada v. White Motor Co.,
32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
51. The presence of an objective standard is particularly critical in design defect
cases. Without an objective standard in these cases, a jury intuitively
determining that a product is defective, and that the defect was the cause in fact
of the plaintiffs injury, may hold a seller liable even though his product's
condition meets society's expectations of product safety.
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when it leaves the hands of the defendant, and (5) which is the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury, and (6) has reached the
consumer without substantial change in its condition. Most of the
enumerated elements - sale, defective condition, attribution,
causation and injury - are identical to those of a warranty action.
The requirement of an unreasonably dangerous, defective
condition, however, is peculiar to strict liability. Section 402A
explains this requirement as follows:
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the
defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer. Many products cannot
possibly be made entirely safe for all consumption, and any
food or drug necessarily involves some risk of harm, if only
from over-consumption. Ordinary sugar is a deadly poison to
diabetics, and castor oil found use under Mussolini as an
instrument of torture. That is not what is meant by
"unreasonably dangerous" in this Section. The article sold
must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it,
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as
to its characteristics.
52
To satisfy the unreasonably dangerous requirement, a plaintiff
must prove not only that the product was dangerous to a degree
beyond that which he expected, but also that it would be considered
dangerous to such a degree by the ordinary consumer.53 The
unreasonably dangerous requirement represents a recognition by the
drafters of Section 402A that even the most benign product can
cause injury under certain circumstances.5 4
III. PARTIES
A. Party Plaintiffs
In a product suit based on negligence, the legal duty of care
involved exists in spite of the absence of a contractual relationship
between any member of the distributive chain and the plaintiff.55 On
the other hand, a buyer historically could maintain a product suit
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment i (1965) (emphasis added).
53. Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 559, 304 A.2d 562 (1973) (so describing
the unreasonably dangerous requirement and then rejecting it for that reason).
54. A few courts, however, have expurgated the unreasonably dangerous require-
ment from strict liability theory. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501
P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972). These courts attempt to "[insure that the
costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufactur-
ers." Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
55. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 100 (4th ed. 1971).
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based on warranty theory only against his immediate seller under
the requirement of vertical privity. Similarly, the requirement of
horizontal privity limited warranty recovery to the purchaser of a
product. In 1969, the Maryland General Assembly amended the
Uniform Commercial Code, expanding the definition of seller so as
to abolish the requirement of privity along the vertical chain,5 6 and
expanding the calss of persons entitled to warranty benefits,
effectively abolishing the requirement of privity along the horizontal
chain.
5 7
The Restatement's version of strict liability in tort expressly
extends to "the user or consumer."5 8 The open question in Maryland
is whether the concept should be regarded as extending to a
bystander.59 Commencing with Elmore v. American Motors Corp.,60
courts faced with the issue consistently experienced little difficulty
including the bystander within the ambit of strict liability.6 1 The
following reasoning is indicative of judicial treatment generally:
To restrict recovery to those who are users is unrealistic in
view of the fact that bystanders have less opportunity to
detect any defect than either purchasers or users. Our
decision is one of policy but is mandated by both justice and
common sense.
62
It is reasonable to expect that the Court of Appeals of Maryland will
not disregard the trend when confronted with the bystander issue.
B. Party Defendants
In product actions based on negligence, the defendant need not
bear a special relationship to the plaintiff, and an individual will be
liable so long as he acts negligently and his actions cause harm to a
56. Law of April 23, 1969, ch. 249, 1969 Md. Laws 709 (codified at MD. COM. LAW
CODE ANN. § 2-314(1)(a) (1975)).
57. Law of April 23, 1969, ch. 249, 1969 Md. Laws 709 (codified at MD. COM. LAW
CODE ANN. § 2-318 (1975)).
58. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965).
59. Some cases have allowed recovery by bystanders. Passwaters v. General Motors
Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972); Wasik v. Borg, 423 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1970);
Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652
(1969); Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (Super. Ct. 1965);
Lomendola v. Mizell, 115 N.J. Super. 514, 280 A.2d 241 (1971); Darryl v. Ford
Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969). Contra, Torpez v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 228
F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1955) (purchaser's sister injured; no implied warranty of fitness
when product selected by self-service); Rodriguez v. Shell's City, Inc., 141 So. 2d
590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (§ 402 not discussed because court required injured
user of product).
60. 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969) (vehicle veered across center
line of highway and collided head-on with plaintiff).
61. See Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 415 (1970).
62. Ciampichini v. Ring Bros., 40 App. Div. 2d 289, 339 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1973).
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foreseeable plaintiff.63 Within the warranty and strict liability
context, however, the relationship between the plaintiff and
defendant may be crucial, responsibility depending upon the scope of
the term "seller." Amendments to the Uniform Commercial Code 64
by the Maryland Legislature in 1969 expanded the term "seller" for
warranty purposes and the term now includes all persons in the
distributive chain.65 Thus, a manufacturer of a product as well as a
maker of a component part, a distributor, and a retailer, as well as
an importer,66 a licensor,67 or a bailor,68 may all be compelled to
respond in damages for breach of warranty.
The term "seller," for purposes of strict liability, has been
construed in other jurisdictions to include the maker of a product
component, 69 as well as an importer, 7° wholesaler, distributor.,
retailer, and manufacturer.1 The reasoning of the Maryland Court
of Appeals in Phipps7 2 requires a similar broad interpretation of the
term "seller."
Although a statutory enactment was necessary to impose
warranty responsibility on bailors and lessors, 73 a broad judicial
63. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 100 (4th ed. 1971).
64. Law of April 23, 1969, ch. 249, 1969 Md. Laws 709 (codified at MD. COM. LAW
CODE ANN. § 2-314 (1975)).
65. See Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 304, 309-310, 363 A.2d 460, 463
(1976).
66. The distributive chain has been construed extra-jurisdictionally to include the
importer, Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975),
and an exclusion in Maryland is unlikely in light of the broadening intent
permeating the 1969 legislative amendment expanding the definition of "seller."
67. See, e.g., Carter v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co., 360 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
(case involving licensor of "Ban-Lon" trademark submitted to jury on the three
standard theories).
68. Legislative amendments have included the bailor or lessor within the circle of
parties subject to warranty responsibility. Law of May 4, 1976, ch. 500, 1976 Md.
Laws 1316 (codified at MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-314 (Supp. 1976)); Law of
April 30, 1974, ch. 315, 1974 Md. Laws 1376-77 (codified at MD. COM. LAW CODE
ANN. § 2-315 (1975)).
69. See, e.g., E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. McCain, 414 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1969)
(defendant, maker of harmless part of final compound, held liable under Texas
law for failure to test final compound, which exploded).
70. See, e.g., Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975)
(defendant, importer of Volkswagen Microbus, held liable under strict liability
theory for vehicle snub-nose design).
71. Comment f to § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that the rule is
intended to apply to any manufacturer, wholesaler, retail dealer, or distributor.
See, e.g., Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977);
Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969);
Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969); Webb v. Zern, 422
Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
72. 278 Md. 377, 363 A.2d 955 (1976).
73. Law of May 4, 1976, ch. 500, 1976 Md. Laws 1316 (codified at MD. COM. LAw
CODE ANN. § 2-314 (Supp. 1976)); Law of April 30, 1974, ch. 315, 1974 Md. Laws
1376-77 (codified at MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §2-315 (1975)). Judicial
extension had been rejected in Bona v. Graefe, 264 Md. 69, 285 A.2d 607 (1972)
(plaintiff injured when brakes of leased golf cart failed to operate properly).
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interpretation of the term "seller", imposing strict liability on such
persons, is a likely step for the Maryland courts. The reasoning of
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service,74 imposing strict
liability on bailors and lessors, will probably prove sufficiently
persuasive to place Maryland among its several adherents: 75
A bailor for hire, such as a person in the U-drive-it business,
puts motor vehicles in the stream of commerce in a fashion
not unlike a manufacturer or retailer. In fact such a bailor
puts the vehicle he buys and then rents to the public to more
sustained use on the highways than most ordinary car
purchasers. The very nature of the business is such that the
bailee, his employees, passengers and the traveling public
are exposed to a greater quantum of potential danger of
harm from defective vehicles than usually arises out of sales
by the manufacturer. We have held that the liability of the
manufacturer might be expressed in terms of strict liability
in tort. . . By analogy the same rule should be made
applicable to the U-drive-it bailor-bailee relationship. Such a
rental must be regarded as accompanied by a representation
that the vehicle is fit for operation on the public highways.
• . . Accordingly, we are of the opinion . . . that the nature
of the U-drive-it business is such that the responsibility of
Hertz may properly be stated in terms of strict liability in
tort. 76
A duty to inspect and test for defects has traditionally been
imposed on a licensor of a product made by another.77 Failure to
comply with this duty is negligence for which liability may be
imposed, if resulting in injury to a foreseeable plaintiff. The licensor
of a product, as contrasted with an endorser,7 8 has also traditionally
74. 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
75. Martin v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 353 A.2d 581 (Del. 1976); Galluccio v. Hertz
Corp., 1 111. App. 3d 272, 274 N.E.2d 178 (1971); Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730,
497 P.2d 732 (1972); George v. Tonjes, 414 F. Supp. 1199 (W.D. Wis. 1976). But see
Bona v. Graefe, 264 Md. 69, 285 A.2d 607 (1972).
76. 45 N.J. 434, 450, 212 A.2d 769, 777-79 (1965).
77. See, e.g., Carter v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co., 360 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
78. Endorsers include those entities whose recommendations, through approval
seals or guarantees, induce consumers to purchase a particular product. The
most feasible theory for recovery by one who purchases a product in reliance on
an endorser's certification of quality, and is thereafter injured by a defect in the
product, would appear to be negligent misrepresentation. See Hempstead v.
General Fire Extinguisher Corp., 269 F. Supp. 109 (D. Del. 1967) (testing
laboratory's summary judgment motion in case applying Virginia law denied,
when person injured by exploding fire extinguisher; laboratory had inspected
and approved design of product and had authorized manufacturer to affix label
stating that extinguisher had been tested for 500 pounds of internal pressure,
when in fact it had not been so tested); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 311,
324 (1965). The attractive warranty theory to date has run afoul the sales-service
distinction, and endorsers have not been held liable for breach of warranty.
Likewise, strict liability is regarded as unavailable for the reason that an
endorser does not technically place goods in the stream of commerce.
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been considered a link in the distributive chain. 79 By virtue of
placement in the chain, the licensor is also potentially subject to
liability premised on breach of warranty and strict liability,
regardless of his exercise of due care. Consequently, the licensor
enters a field of exposure not previously of practical concern.
The seller of a used or reconditioned product, somewhat like the
licensor, now finds himself inextricably involved with product
litigation, principally as a result, once again, of the shift in focus
from "care" to "product performance." Originally, strict liability was
thought inapplicable to the seller of a used or reconditioned product
because such a seller could not be regarded as participating in the
"creation of the risk," a touchstone of the strict liability theory.8 s The
fllinois intermediate appellate court, however, jettisoned the seller of
a used or reconditioned product into the sphere of potential strict
liability exposure through the following rationale:8'
Manufacturers of defective products are strictly liable for
harm caused by such products as public policy demands that
responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively
reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in such
products which reach the market. Similarly, the imposition
of strict liability upon a retailer arises from that person's
integral role in the overall producing enterprise and affords
additional incentive to safety. . . . Although the seller of
used motor vehicles is not an immediate participant in the
overall producing process as is the manufacturer or retailer,
the fundamental safety, or deterrence purpose behind strict
liability mandates the rule's application in this case. That is
to say, if the seller of used motor vehicles knows that he may
be held strictly liable for the sale of a defective vehicle that
may result in injury to the purchaser or another, he will
obviously exert every precaution to avoid the potential
injury and liability that may occur. This factor of deterrence
as justification for the imposition of strict products liability
is well established. . . . Our holding, therefore, should
effectuate safer used motor vehicles to be placed into the
stream of commerce; for this has been the desired result of
the doctrine's application to manufacturers and retailers.8 2
79. See Carter v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co., 360 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
80. Negligence and warranty theories, practically speaking, have proved to be
somewhat inappropriate for the sale of used or reconditioned products. Lack of
due care is difficult to prove when dealing with reconditioned products, and the
warranty premise is usually confronted with disclaimers of "As Is" or express
warranties of only thirty days duration.
81. Peterson v. Lou Backrodt Chevrolet Co., 17 Ill. App. 3d 690, 307 N.E.2d 729
(1974), rev'd, 61 Ill. 2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 725 (1975) (action against used car dealer to
recover for wrongful death of one child and for severe injury to another when
children struck by allegedly defective used car sold by defendant).
82. Id. at 694, 307 N.E.2d at 732.
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Although the intermediate court was reversed by the Illinois
Supreme Court, its trend-setting rationale has gained impetus as a
result of recent decisions in other jurisdictions.8 3 It seems reasonable
to expect that when the Maryland Court of Appeals is confronted
with the issue, it will not disregard the indicated trend, so long as
that trend's present decisional strength is maintained.
IV. THE UNIVERSAL ELEMENTS
Regardless of theory, a plaintiff must satisfy three product
litigation basics from an evidentiary standpoint: (1) the existence of
a defect, (2) the attribution of the defect to a "seller," and (3) a causal
relation between the defect and injury. The Maryland Court of
Appeals in Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,8 4
in noting these prerequisites to recovery, quoted Dean Prosser with
approval: 5 "The plaintiff must prove ... that he was injured
because the product was defective, or otherwise unsafe for his
use .... Further, the plaintiff must prove that the defect was in the
product when it was sold by the particular defendant."8 6
A. Defect
From a practical viewpoint, a defect for negligence purposes is
often a defect for warranty or strict liability purposes as well. Yet
"defect" may be conceptualized somewhat differently, depending on
the theory. A defect in the negligence sense would include a failure to
meet intended specifications, whether in construction, fabrication,
manufacture, assembly, or inspection.8 7 A defect for negligence
purposes would also arise when a product meets specifications, but
has a dangerous design or was inadequately tested before market-
ing, or lacks sufficient warnings or directions for use.88 A defect in
the warranty sense arises when the product does not conform to
express representations made by the seller,8 9 or when the product is
unfit, unmerchantable, unwholesome, unsafe, or unfit for its
particular purpose ° A defect for purposes of strict liability results
83. Turner v. Int'l Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 366 A.2d 62 (1975) (action
against truck manufacturers and dealer to recover for death of buyer when cab of
used truck, which had to be raised to obtain access to engine, collapsed and fell
on buyer); Hovendon v. Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. 1975) (action for damages
resulting from alleged deterioration of walls due to defect in used bricks that
defendant sold to plaintiff).
84. 273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d 1 (1975).
85. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
86. 273 Md. 592, 609, 332 A.2d 1, 11 (1975).
87. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 96 (4th ed. 1971).
88. See, e.g., E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. McCain, 414 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1969);
Moran v. Fabrege, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975).




when the product contains a physical flaw, or does not meet
specifications, or where it is manufactured pursuant to specifica-
tions, but a flaw exists in the design, testing methods, or instruc-
tions. 91
Product defects may be proved by direct or circumstantial
evidence, or by a combination of both.92 The predominant method of
proof of "defect" is through the use of expert testimony. 93 The expert
testifies to the results of his examination of the product, and opines,
to the degree of requisite certainty, the existence of the defect. An
expert can be used to testify that the product was defective or
unsafe,94 or that there was a safer way to design the product within
present industry standards. 95 Expert testimony on the availability of
a safer alternative method of manufacture is particularly pertinent
in crashworthiness or second collision cases. 96 In such cases a
manufacturer may be liable in negligence for a design defect that
aggravates injuries received in an accident, even though the defect
was not the cause of the accident.
The thesis of the crashworthiness recovery approach, which has
developed in automobile product litigation, is that manufacturers
have a duty to design and construct automobiles that will not expose
the occupants to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a
collision.97 Determining whether creation of an unreasonable danger
has occurred involves a balancing of the gravity and likelihood of
possible harm against the burden of precautions which would be
effective to avoid the harm.98 Some basic proof requirements in
crashworthiness cases have been pronounced:
Unlike orthodox products liability or negligence litigation,
crashworthy or second collision cases impugning the design
of an automobile require a highly refined and almost
invariably difficult presentation of proof in three aspects.
91. Id. §98.
92. See, e.g., Browder v. Pettigrew, 541 S.W.2d 402 (Tenn. 1976).
93. See Radman v. Harold, 279 Md. 167, 367 A.2d 472 (1977) (qualifications of expert
for particular testimony).
94. See, e.g., Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Co., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972) (punch press
was "booby trap" due to lack of safety devices in basic design).
95. See, e.g., Finnegan v. Havir Mfg. Co., 60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972)
(substitution of electrical pedal for mechanical foot treadle on punch press).
96. See, e.g., Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976).
97. See Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974).
98. Id.; Dreisonstock v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974). Factors
to be considered in determining whether an unreasonable risk of injury exists in
the event of collision are the defect's obviousness, the vehicle's purposes, design,
utility style, attractiveness, and marketability, the vehicle's price and, in
particular, the effect which added safety features would have upon the price
relative to marketability, and finally, the circumstances of the particular
collision. See generally Digges, The Impact of Liability for Enhanced Injury, 5 U.
BALT. L. REV. 1 (1975).
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First, in establishing that the design in question was
defective the plaintiff must offer proof of an alternative,
safer design, practicable under the circumstances ...
Second, the plaintiff must offer proof of what injuries, if any,
would have resulted had the alternative, safer design been
used. . . .Third, as a corollary to the second aspect of proof,
the plaintiff must offer some method of establishing the
extent of enhanced injuries attributable to the defective
design.99
A product, otherwise sound, may be held defective for lack of an
adequate warning. 100 When a product's warnings and instructions
will be sufficient in the consumer marketplace to insulate the
product seller from responsibility for inadequacy of the warning is
unpredictable.10 1 The purpose of a warning, of course, is to give the
user knowledge and an opportunity to appreciate danger. Histori-
cally a negligence concept, the absence of a warning or lack of an
adequate warning is today regarded as rendering a product defective
for purposes of any of the commonly used theories. 10 2 The Maryland
Court of Appeals' decision in Moran v. Faberge, Inc.,0 3 is
representative of precisely why the inadequate warning type of
defect is troublesome to a seller. The court stated its view as follows:
[W]e think that in the products liability domain a duty to
warn is imposed on a manufacturer if the item it produces
has an inherent and hidden danger about which the
producer knows, or should know, could be a substantial
factor in bringing injury to an individual or his property
when the manufacturer's product comes near to or in contact
with the elements which are present normally in the
environment where the product can reasonably be expected
to be brought or used.1 0 4
99. Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737-38 (3d Cir. 1976). In Huddell, plaintiffs
decedent received fatal injuries allegedly because his head was driven into the
protruding edge of a head restraint when his vehicle was rear-ended while
stopped on a bridge. Plaintiffs substantial verdict was later vacated, and the
matter remanded for a new trial because of an improper standard of proof
employed by the trial judge.
100. See Moran v. Fabrege, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975).
101. Adequacy or effectiveness of a product's warning will almost always be an issue
for the trier of fact. See, e.g., Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958).
102. See, e.g., Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1975) (purchaser of
motor home who sued manufacturer and seller for damages sustained because of
defective wheel studs stated cause of action under strict liability or warranty
theories; purchaser had been instructed on use and maintenance of wheel studs,
but not of inherent risks he could encounter if instructions were not followed).
103. 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975) (manufacturer who failed to warn of
flammability of perfume held liable to plaintiff who poured perfume on base of lit
candle).
104. Id. at 552, 332 A.2d at 20 (emphasis added).
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In Moran, the court injected into the duty to warn an additional
duty to foresee any danger that might result when the product enters
its normal environment. This duty is indeed an expansive one, since
any home or business establishment in which a product is used will
normally contain numerous environmental factors which might
affect product performance. 105 One caveat to the plaintiff seeking to
recover on the defect theory of inadequate warning is that there is no
right to recover when the party to be warned is already appreciative
of the danger.
10 6
The failure or malfunction of a product, alone, is not sufficient
circumstantial evidence that the product is, or was, defective. 0 7 A
plaintiff must prove that the product failed because it was
defective. 08 Likewise, the mere fact that the product caused injury
standing alone is not sufficient evidence to establish the existence of
a defect. 0 9 "[Tihe addition of very little more in the way of other
facts," 1 0 however, is required to support the inference.
Some general categories of circumstantial evidence are invaria-
bly given probative value in determining the existence of a defect.
The product's nature and the accident's pattern are always the
subject of evidence. Although proof of the product's physical and
105. Cf. Kidwell, The Duty to Warn, 53 TExAS L. REv. 1375, 1395-1406 (1975).
106. See, e.g., Martinex v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 529 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1976)
(manufacturer of petrochemical not liable to widow of decedent barge worker,
who was overcome by noxious fumes); Burton v. L.O. Smith Foundry Products
Co., 529 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1976) (action against supplier of compound which
ignited and fatally burned decedent failed when, prior to accident, decedent's
employer knowingly added kerosene to compound); Wilhelm v. Globe Solvent Co.,
373 A.2d 218 (Del. 1977) (cleaning solvent manufacturer not liable for failure to
warn when plaintiff had actual knowledge of flammability).
107. See, e.g., Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967) (evidence of
wheel malfunction insufficient to prove prima facie that wheel failed to perform
as ordinary customer would have expected).
108. See, e.g., Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 42 N.J. 177, 199 A.2d
826 (1964) (plaintiff failed to prove that abrasive disc, which broke and struck
him, was defective); Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969).
109. See, e.g., Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976) (action to
recover for deaths and injuries caused by plane crash predicated on alleged
uncrashworthiness of plane); Kupkowski v. Avis, 395 Mich. 155, 235 N.W.2d 324
(1976) (evidence presented by plaintiff insufficient to sustain claim that car
brakes defective); Logan v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 216 Va. 425, 219 S.E.2d 685
(1976) (mere fact of explosion did not establish stone defective).
110. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 843 (1975); accord, Greco
v. Bucciconi Eng'r Co., 407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1969) (defective condition of magnetic
sheet piler inferred from proof that it functioned improperly in absence of
abnormal use and reasonable secondary causes); Elmore v. American Motors
Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969) (inference that
subsequently discovered defect existed at time of sale permitted when car newly
purchased); Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Haw. 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970)
(evidence that just prior to accident car veered sufficient to show defect in
automobile); Vanek v. Kirby, 253 Or. 494, 450 P.2d 778 (1969) (vehicle
uncontrollable in normal operation sustained claim of existence of defective
mechanism).
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chemical qualities, propensities, and activities does not generally
prove that the product caused the accident, the evidence often goes to
the threshold issue of whether the product was defective and could
have caused the accident.1 1' Evidence offered on the circumstances
surrounding the accident generally shows only that a defect could
have been operative in causing the accident, but such evidence
might prove to be the key to ultimate persuasion of the trier of fact.
Proof of passage of time between the sale and accident can disprove
the existence of a defect. 1 1 2 Some products are more likely to wear out
by use than others, and when the product is such that its failure
could be the result of use during the period after sale, lapse of time
and use tend strongly to establish that the defect was not present
when the product left the seller's hands." 3 Introduction of facts
about the life history of a product, including similar previous failures
or injuries and subsequent repairs may be circumstantial evidence of
defect." 4 Product history evidence can be equally valuable to a
defendant where a product has been used for a substantial period of




Sometimes referred to as identity, the elemental requirement of
attribution in product litigation is usually not difficult to satisfy. The
plaintiff must prove that a particular defendant is responsible for
111. See, e.g., Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.J. 454, 332 A.2d 599 (1975).
112. Compare Tucson Gen. Hosp. v. Russell, 7 Ariz. App. 193, 437 P.2d 677 (1968) (x-
ray machine that injured plaintiff had been disassembled twice since sold to
defendant fourteen years before accident) with Clary v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler
Center, Inc., 454 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1969) (plaintiff alleged that carbon monoxide
poisoning due to defects in two-week old car).
113. See, e.g., Kleve v. General Motors Corp., 210 N.W.2d 568 (Iowa 1973); cf. Hawkins
v. Larrance Tank Corp., 555 P.2d 91 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976).
114. Courts are split on the question of whether prior similar complaints are
admissible to show a causal relationship between a particular product-and an
accident. Compare Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 258 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1958)
with Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962). Despite the split,
the evidence may be admissible on other grounds, since both Prashker and
Spruill held that such evidence was admissible to show defendant's notice.
Evidence of subsequent repairs, alterations, or warnings has been held
admissible to show that defendant had control of the product that caused the
accident, or over the place where it occurred, e.g., Wallner v. Kitchens of Sara
Lee, Inc., 419 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1969), to prove feasibility of a safer design, e.g.,
Stark v. Allis-Chalmers & Northwest Roads, Inc., 467 P.2d 854 (Wash. Ct. App.
1970), or to prove the state. of a manufacturer's knowledge of the dangers of a
product prior to the accident, e.g., Sterner v. U.S. Plywood Champion Paper, Inc.,
519 F.2d 1352 (8th Cir. 1975). The rule prohibiting evidence of subsequent repairs
to show implied acknowledgement of the defective condition is becoming the
exception rather than the rule. E.g., Smyth v. Upjohn Co., 529 F.2d 803 (2d Cir.
1975); Ault v. Int'l Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 129, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812
(1974); Shaffer v. Honeywell, Inc., 249 N.W.2d 251 (S.D. 1976).
115. See, e.g., Tucson Gen. Hosp. v. Russell, 7 Ariz. App. 193, 437 P.2d 677 (1968).
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the product in the capacity in which he issued it,116 and the product's
defect must be tried to a point in time when a particular defendant in
the distributive chain had control.
117
Occasionally, however, this requirement can be troublesome.
118
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals' decision in Undeck v.
Consumer's Discount Supermarket, Inc." 9 is illustrative. There
plaintiff sought recovery from the manufacturer and seller of the
disinfectant-cleaner known as Lysol for injuries sustained when the
bottle fell from its cardboard container and shattered on the
supermarket's floor. Plaintiffs evidence failed to mention the name
of the manufacturer, and was imprecise in identifying the retailer of
the allegedly defective product. The trial court directed verdicts for
the two defendants. The appellate court, which affirmed after a
review of the merits of the case generally, made this statement on
the attribution issue:
We hold that the rule is that in proving the identity of
an individual party in a case, something more than bald
identity of names is required, and that in proving the
identity of a corporate or other business entity which is a
party in a case, something less than precise identity of
names may be sufficient.
In expressing this rule we reemphasize that precision in
the proof of names of parties involved in litigation is highly
important, especially because such proof is ordinarily easy
to obtain and simple to produce, and because failure to
produce it may prevent the decision of a case on its merits.' 2°
C. Causation
Regardless of theory - negligence, breach of warranty, or strict
liability - a causal connection between the defective condition and
the plaintiffs injury must be shown. In Maryland, "causation in
fact" is considered separately from the related issue involving scope
of duty.1
21
Causation in fact is a question for the jury and involves a
determination of whether the alleged defective condition was a
substantial factor in bringing about the claimed loss. 22 Occasion-
ally, it is quite difficult to prove that the alleged defect in fact caused
116. See, e.g., Champlin v. Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co., 324 F.2d 74 (10th Cir. 1963).
117. See, e.g., McNamara v. American Motors Corp., 247 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1957); cf.
Eaton Corp. v. Wright, 281 Md. 80, 375 A.2d 1122 (1977).
118. See, e.g., Springer Corp. v. Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co., 90 N.M. 58, 559 P.2d
846 (1976); Beasley v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 239 N.C. 681, 80 S.E.2d 642 (1954).
119. 29 Md. App. 444, 349 A.2d 635 (1975).
120. Id. at 453, 349 A.2d at 640.
121. Certain-teed Products Corp. v. Goslee Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc., 26 Md. App.
452, 339 A.2d 302 (1975), cert. denied, 276 Md. 739 (1975).
122. Peterson v. Underwood, 258 Md. 9, 264 A.2d 851 (1970); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §431 (1965); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §41, at 240 (4th ed. 1971).
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the injury. A component failure may be the cause of an occurrence,
or may be caused by an occurrence. In most cases, expert testimony
is essential to prove the causal relationship between the product, the
accident, and the injury. 123 In some cases, however, the circumstan-
tial evidence may warrant an inference that a defect in the product
caused the harm.124 Determination of the scope of a defendant's duty
to a particular plaintiff will turn on the degree of the defendant's
contact with the distributive chain responsible for an allegedly
defective product.125
Several of the substantive defenses, discussed in more detail
below, actually involve issues of causation. Such defenses deal with
conduct of the plaintiff, or another, alleged to affect the performance
of the product to such an extent that the conduct is a superseding
cause of the harm.
V. DEFENSES
The traditional cliche "Let the Buyer Beware" has undergone
substantial alteration during the recent rise in product litigation. It
now reads: "Let the Seller Beware." This phenomena is dramatically
illustrated by the evolution of affirmative defenses in product suits.
Today the defendant focuses almost entirely on the conduct of the
plaintiff - the manner in which the product was being used at the
time of the accident, the plaintiffs relationship to such use, and the
plaintiffs prior knowledge of the product's condition or its instruc-
tions for use, including warnings, if any. This focus results in
widespread use of the defenses of contributory negligence, assump-
tion of risk, misuse or abuse of the product, and alteration or
modification of the product. 1 26 With the exception of the statutes of
limitations, technical defenses of a self-determinative character,
such as lack of privity, or failure to give notice, are essentially non-
existent.
127
123. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965).
124. See, e.g., Lindroth v. Walgreen Co., 407 Ill. 121, 94 N.E.2d 847 (1950).
125. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. McCain, 414 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1969); see
Certain-teed Products Corp. v. Goslee Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc., 26 Md. App.
452, 339 A.2d 302 (1975).
126. These substantive defenses, which often tend to blend together in product
liability actions, actually tend to counter plaintiffs proof of causation.
127. Privity requirements and disclaimer availability in warranty actions were
eliminated by statutory amendments even before adoption of strict liability in
tort. Law of May 17, 1971, ch. 505, 1971 Md. Laws 1131-32 (codified at MD. COM.
LAw CODE ANN. § 2-316.1 (1975)); Laws of April 23, 1969, ch. 249, 1969 Md. Laws
709 (codified at MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. §§2-314, 2-318 (1975)). Since
adoption of strict liability in tort, the notice requirement of § 2-607(3)(a) has been
construed to pertain only to a buyer. Mattos, Inc. v. Hash, 279 Md. 371, 389 A.2d
993 (1977); Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 304, 363 A.2d 460 (1976).
The Phipps case contained a collateral warranty issue that focused on the
restrictiveness of the "injured in person" language contained in 2-318. The




Proof of contributory negligence is a defense standard to
negligence actions which, by its nature, involves a showing that the
plaintiff violated an applicable standard of care. 128 If the defendant
can demonstrate that the plaintiff was negligent in his own conduct
at the time injuries were sustained, he will be absolved of all
responsibility. 1
29
There has been conflict over the applicability of the defense in
warranty actions. This conflict arises because of the conceptual
difficulty in invoking a defense standard to tort actions in an action
for breach of warranty. Several courts have held that contributory
negligence will not bar an action in contract for breach of
warranty. 130 Others have held that contributory negligence may be
invoked in warranty actions as well as in tort actions.' 3' Several
cases refusing to apply contributory negligence as a bar to warranty
actions nevertheless allow evidence of such negligence to negate the
plaintiffs case under one of the following approaches: (1) the
conduct is actually not negligence, but assumption of risk;132 (2) the
conduct which amounts to no more than traditional negligence is
considered as rebuttal to plaintiffs allegations of defectiveness; 133 (3)
the conduct, not the defective product, is the proximate cause of the
injuries. 3 4 The third approach appears to have the favor of the
Maryland Court of Appeals.
35
The defense of contributory negligence is not an available
defense to strict liability in tort premised on Section 402A, at least
Corp., 278 Md. 337, 353-56, 363 A.2d 955, 963-65 (1976). In view of this
interpretation, Maryland courts will probably have little difficulty with allowing
a Maryland wrongful death action to be premised on breach of a Uniform
Commercial Code warranty. See generally Freeman & Dressel, Warranty Law in
Maryland Product Liability Cases: Strict Liability Incognito?, 5 U. BALT. L. REV.
47 (1975).
For choice of law purposes, breach of warranty actions are treated as
contractual in nature, while negligence and strict liability actions are considered
tortious in nature. See Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d
118 (1975).
128. See, e.g., Hutzler Bros. Co. v. Taylor, 247 Md. 228, 230 A.2d 663 (1967).
129. See, e.g., Crouse v. Hagedorn, 253 Md. 679, 253 A.2d 834 (1969).
130. See Levine, Buyer's Conduct as Affecting the Extent of Manufacturer's Liability
in Warranty, 52 MINN. L. REV. 627, 631 n.25 (1968).
131. Id. at 650 n.104.
132. This approach avoids the involvement of negligence concepts in warranty law.
See Carmen v. Eli Lilly Co., 109 Ind. App. 76, 32 N.E.2d 729 (1941).
133. This approach is premised on the thought that if, in the absence of the plaintiffs
conduct, the product would have performed properly, the trier of fact may be
persuaded that the product was not defective. See Youtz v. Thompson Tire Co., 46
Cal. App. 2d 672, 116 P.2d 636 (1941).
134. Erdman v. Johnson Bros. Radio & Television Co., 260 Md. 190, 271 A.2d 744
(1970).




when the alleged contributory negligence is a failure on the part of a
plaintiff to detect or guard against the defect's existence.13 6
B. Assumption of Risk
A defense available in a product action, regardless of recovery
theory, is assumption of risk; a person may not recover for an injury
received when he voluntarily exposes himself to a known and
appreciated danger. 1 37 To invoke the defense the defendant must
show that the plaintiff
(1) discovered the defective condition,
(2) fully understood the danger,
(3) disregarded the known danger, and
(4) voluntarily exposed himself to it.
13
8
The existence of knowledge of the specific defect on the part of
the plaintiff is critical.139 The fact that the injured person should
have known of the danger is generally insufficient, but a person may
be charged with knowledge when he has actual knowledge of facts
which should make the danger clear and obvious to him.14°
The test for measuring the plaintiff's knowledge is subjective
since the knowledge, understanding, and appreciation of the danger
that the actual user possessed must be considered, rather than that
possessed by the mythical reasonably prudent person.1 41 In short,
the knowledge requirement is joined with an appreciation require-
136. Comment n to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 402A clarifies this rule:
n. Contributory negligence. Contributory negligence of the plain-
tiff is not a defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to
discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of
its existence. On the other hand, the form of contributory negligence
which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter
a known danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of
risk, is a defense under this Section as in other cases of strict liability. If
the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and
nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is
injured by it, he is barred from recovery.
137. Western Maryland Ry. v. Griffis, 253 Md. 643, 253 A.2d 889 (1969); Chalmers v.
Willis, 247 Md. 379, 231 A.2d 70 (1967); see Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519
S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974) (evidence insufficient to sustain claim that plaintiff
assumed risk by continuing to drive after discovery of defective throttle).
138. See Western Maryland Ry. v. Griffis, 253 Md. 643, 253 A.2d 889 (1969).
139. For example, knowledge of the general hazard involved in operating a punch
press machine will not alone support the defense. See, e.g., Rhoads v. Service
Machine Co., 329 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916
(Tex. Ct. App. 1976).
140. Kuka v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 36 Ill. App. 3d 752, 344 N.E.2d 655 (1976)
(jury verdict that plaintiff assumed risk of alleged design defect in motorcycle as
to moving parts in which jacket could become entangled upheld).
141. See, e.g., Doran v. Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. App. 3d 981, 360
N.E.2d 440 (1977) (railway worker lacked knowledge of risk in moving under cars
assigned for cleaning); Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976)
(decedent killed when bed of brother's dump truck descended while decedent
working beneath raised bed).
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ment and if by reason of age, lack of information, experience,
intelligence or judgment, the plaintiff did not understand the risk
involved, he will not be taken to have assumed that risk.
C. Misuse/Abuse
Regardless of recovery theory, a manufacturer is not responsible
if his product becomes dangerous because of misuse by a consumer;
the manufacturer has no duty, generally, to design safeguards into a
product in anticipation of misuse. 142 Misuse involves a use of the
product in a manner not reasonably foreseeable by the seller or
manufacturer. 143 A product is not misused, however, merely because
the manufacturer intended that it be used in a different manner. The
manufacturer must show that the use which caused the injury was
not reasonably foreseeable. 14 4 A traditional argument by manufac-
turers that liability exists only for injuries arising out of intended
uses, as compared to the broader category of foreseeable uses, is
essentially extinct.145 The reasoning of the Maryland Court of
Appeals in Moran v. Faberge, Inc.,146 on the issue of foreseeability of
use in a negligence context, suggests future adherence to a strict
treatment of the misuse defense when the issue is posed in the
context of the other product theories. In Moran, the court held that a
jury question was presented on the foreseeability of use issue when
the plaintiff was severely burned by a flash explosion which resulted
when the plaintiffs friend poured some cologne on the base of a lit
candle. In defining the requisite degree of foreseeability, the court
stated:
[T]he unusual and bizarre details of accidents, which human
experience shows are far from unlikely, are only significant
as background facts to the individual case; it is not
necessary that the manufacturer foresee the exact manner in
which accidents occur. Thus, in the context of this case, it
was not necessary for a cologne manufacturer to foresee that
142. See, e.g., Latimer v. General Motors Corp., 535 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1976) (action to
recover for personal injuries failed when manufacturer had no duty to foresee
cotter pin disjuncture from drive shaft machanism).
143. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. Langley, 422 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Ct. App.
1967) (plaintiff's knowing violation of plain, unambiguous instructions that
accompanied allegedly defective permanent hair wave product held to constitute
misuse and bar recovery).
144. Tucci v. Bossert, 53 App. Div. 2d 291, 385 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1976); Olson v. A.W.
Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1977); Otis Elevator Co. v. Wood, 436
S.W.2d 324 (Tex. 1968).
145. See, e.g., Kudelka v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 541 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1976)
(plaintiff sued manufacturer of crane that collapsed and injured him during
attempt to lift excessive weight); Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261
N.E.2d 305 (1970) (plaintiff machine operator sued manufacturer of trenching
machine that allegedly lurched, threw him, and then ran over him).
146. 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975).
19771
Baltimore Law Review
someone would be hurt when a friend poured its product
near the flame of a lit candle; it was only necessary that it
be foreseeable to the producer that its product, while in its
normal environment, may be brought near a catalyst, likely
to be found in that environment, which can untie the
chattel's inherent danger.
141
The strict standard for application of the misuse/abuse defense is
aptly stated in Bradford v. Bendix-Westinghouse Auto Air Brake
Co.:
1 4 8
Section 402A does recognize a defense for the manufacturer
where the consumer or user mishandles or misuses the
product and thereby creates the dangerous condition.
Primarily this defense is intended to protect the manufac-
turer from becoming an absolute insurer for all injuries
arising out of the use of his product. The usual situation in
which the defense will arise is where the product is being
used in a way in which it was not intended to be used.
However, a prerequisite for the defense is that the product
must have been in a safe condition when it reached the user.
If it was unreasonably dangerous at that time, the
'intervening' acts of the user can only be additional
proximate causes making the two parties joint tortfeasors.
Of course, the defect in the product must itself be a
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury before the plaintiff
can recover. The manufacturer could not be held liable
simply because of the existence of the defect when the real
cause of the accident was the conduct of the user of the
product. Only in this sense can the manufacturer be relieved
of liability due to the acts of the user or a third party.
Gardner v. Q.H.S., Inc.,149 presents an instructive situation in
which foreseeable misuse did not absolve a manufacturer of liability.
The case involved a woman who heated her hair rollers, according to
instructions, in a pan of water on the stove. Although the
manufacturer knew that paraffin inside the rollers would be released
if all of the water was boiled out of the pan, and that paraffin had a
147. Id. at 553, 332 A.2d at 20.
148. 517 P.2d 406, 413 (Colo. 1973). The majority in Findlay v. Copeland Lumber Co.,
265 Or. 300, 306, 509 P.2d 28, 31 (1973), explained:
As we understand comment h, to Section 402A, "abnormal" use does not'
mean every instance of negligence, however slight, in connection with
the use of the product. The product must be safe for "normal" handling
and consumption. Misuse, to bar recovery, must be a use or handling so
unusual that the average consumer could not reasonably expect the
product to be designed and manufactured to withstand it - a use which
the seller, therefore need not anticipate and provide for.
149. 448 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1971).
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low flashpoint, the plaintiff was given no warning of the risks
involved. The user decided to take a bath while waiting for the
rollers to heat and fell asleep in the tub. The released paraffin
ignited, and the house burned down. The manufacturer was held
responsible to the owner of the building for failure to provide the
user with complete information.
Another good illustration of the misuse defense in operation is
McCready v. United Iron and Steel Co.15 There the court, in the
context of a negligence action, used language equally applicable to
implied warranty or strict liability in tort. The court held that the
manufacturer of steel casement windows could not be held liable for
the death of a workman who fell while using a casement as a ladder
when one of the casement's crossbars failed. The court stated:
A manufacturer may assume that his product will be
devoted to its normal use. And if it is safe when devoted to
the normal use for which it was manufactured, he is not
liable in damages for injury resulting from an abnormal or
unusual use not reasonably anticipated. Appellee manufac-
tured the casements for use as window frames .... And it
is not suggested that they were unsafe when devoted to that
purpose.151
The former narrowness with which the concept of "intended
use" was judicially viewed has been injected with a foreseeability
factor which renders the misuse/abuse defense of little value to
product defendants. The manufacturer's existing duty is aptly
reflected in this illustration: A screwdriver maker must anticipate
that its product will not only be used to turn screws - the intended
use - but also used to pry open lids of paint cans - the foreseeable
use - and must therefore make the shank strong enough for both
purposes.
D. Alteration
Alteration is a defense which indicates lack of causation in some
cases; in other cases, there is no defect in the original product, the
defect being caused by subsequent alterations. Alteration can serve
as a defense regardless of the plaintiff's theory.
Section 402A's statement of responsibility under the strict
liability theory well illustrates the alteration defense. A prerequisite
to recovery is that the product "reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it was sold."' 15 2 The
150. 272 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1959).
151. Id. at 703 (citations omitted).
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)(b) (1965).
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substantial change concept is particularly important since products
today rarely reach ultimate consumers without passing through
several processing stages. As a result, courts often are asked to
determine whether alterations made after a product left its
manufacturer's control were substantial enough to relieve the
manufacturer of responsibility for injury caused by the product.
Before such a determination can be made, a court must examine the
cause of an injury, since an alteration with no effect on the
occurrence of an injury will be regarded as insubstantial. For
example, in Ward v. Hobart Mfg., Co., 15 3 a manufacturer of a meat
grinder was relieved from liability for injuries sustained through the
use of his product because a guard that would have prevented the
accident was removed. The result, the court noted, would have been
different if the guard's presence would not have prevented the harm.
Of course, it should be recognized that a manufacturer must design a
product so that foreseeable modifications will not cause product
failure. Anticipated change will not relieve a manufacturer from
liability.154
VI. INDEMNITY AND CONTRIBUTION
An issue common to all product liability suits involves the
ultimate distribution of the judgment burden. In many cases a
product plaintiff sues not only his immediate seller but also the
distributor, the manufacturer, and all other parties in the distribu-
tive chain. In other cases the plaintiff elects to sue only one member
of the distributive chain, but others are brought in under the liberal
rules of third party practice. 155 In yet other cases, a defendant
institutes a separate action against a co-member of the distributive
chain after settling the claim or satisfying a judgment of a product
plaintiff.156 In all of these situations, a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff yields a new battle to determine whether one, several, or all
of the defendants will be forced to bear the judgment burden.157
153. 317 F. Supp. 841 (S.D. Miss. 1970), aff'd 450 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1970).
154. Comment j of § 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS discusses a
manufacturer's liability when his product is expected to, and does, undergo
further processing or other substantial change after it leaves his hands, and
before it reaches those of the ultimate user or consumer. No mention is made of
where liability rests in those situations in which the expected change does not
occur. Compare Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965)
with Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Co., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
155. FED. R. Civ. P. 14; MD. R. Civ. P. 315.
156. The statute of limitations in indemnity and contribution cases premised in tort,
runs from the time that payment is made to the injured party and not from the
date of injury. Southern Maryland Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 203 F. Supp. 449 (D. Md.
1962).
157. In this new battle, the defenses applicable in the original action, such as misuse,
alteration, or in some cases, contributory negligence, are available to the party
resisting indemnity or contribution. E.g., Fargo Machine & Tool Co. v. Kearney
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Indemnity and contribution are the two legal mechanisms
commonly employed by defendants seeking to shift the brunt of a
judgment. Although both involve attempts to shift legal responsibil-
ity, each rests on a different legal theory and provides a different
result. Indemnity is based on principles of contract, express or
implied in law, 158 while contribution is a statutory remedy premised
on the equitable principle that liability should be apportioned among
all those persons whose tortious conduct contributes to the plaintiffs
injury.159 When indemnity is successfully employed, one defendant is
entirely relieved of the judgment burden, while the others are
required to bear the whole expense.lw On the other hand, the
contribution mechanism merely operates to spread the judgment
burden among all defendants and to require each to pay his
proportionate share.16'
A. Indemnity
A product liability case may be ripe for use of the indemnifica-
tion mechanism under any of the following circumstances: (1) when
there is an express contract of indemnity involved; (2) when there is
an implied contract of indemnity under which the primary
wrongdoer is obliged to respond to all damages; (3) when there is a
single warranty running through the distributive chain linking all
defendants; and (4) when the underlying theory of liability is strict
liability in tort, and the potential indemnitor was initially responsi-
ble for placing the defective product in the stream of commerce.
A buyer is free to obtain an express agreement from his seller,
obligating the seller to indemnify the buyer against any damages he
may suffer as a result of liability to a third party arising from
subsequent resale of the product or other use. In Eaton Corporation
v. Wright, 62 for example, the Maryland Court of Appeals granted
indemnity to the distributor of a defective fuel cannister against the
manufacturer, under a contract which obligated the latter to pay the
amount of any judgment entered against the distributor.163 A seller
is likewise free to exact from his buyer an agreement to indemnify
& Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (supplier of component part
not liable to seller in indemnity when evidence showed component part had been
altered after it left supplier's control).
158. Southern Maryland Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 203 F. Supp. 449, 452 (D. Md. 1962).
159. Id.; MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, § 17 (1972).
160. Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 552,
552-53 (1936); Note, Another Look at Strict Liability: The Effect on Contribution
Among Tortfeasors, 79 DiC. L. REV. 125, 127 (1974).
161. Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, §§ 16-222
(1972).
162. 281 Md. 80, 375 A.2d 1122 (1977).
163. Id. at 88 n.2 375 A.2d at 1123, 1126 n.2.
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the seller against the claims of third persons injured by the product.
Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 6 4 involved a situation in which a manu-
facturer/seller of a printing press and drying oven were held liable
in strict liability and negligence to the buyer's two employees, who
were seriously injured due to a defect in the oven. The manu-
facturer/seller filed a third party claim for indemnity against the
buyer, based on an express agreement in the contract of sale which
provided:
Buyer agrees to indemnify Hoe [manufacturer] and save it
harmless from any and all liability for injury to persons
(other than Hoe's employees) or property, which may result
from any cause whatsoever after the machinery herein is
delivered to Buyer.1
65
Two documents comprised the contract of sale, the first including the
quoted indemnity clause covering the "machinery herein delivered"
and setting forth the items so described. The defective ovens were
not included in the list, but were instead covered by a separate
document which included no indemnification agreement. 166 The
court refused to enforce the indemnity provision, since "indemnifica-
tion contracts are to be narrowly construed and all ambiguity is to
be resolved against indemnity."167 The general rule requiring strict
construction of indemnity agreements is rigorously enforced when
the potential indemnitee is himself guilty of negligence; contracts of
indemnity will not be construed to indemnify a person against his
own negligence unless an intention to do so is expressed in
unequivocal terms. 68 The party seeking to escape liability for his
negligent conduct may generally not rely on an express contract of
indemnity, but must seek alternative means of shifting responsibil-
ity.
The second set of circumstances giving rise to indemnity occurs
when two persons are jointly liable in tort, one being the principal or
primary wrongdoer and the other being only passively negligent. In
such a situation the law implies a contract of indemnity under which
the primary wrongdoer must bear full responsibility for the joint
wrong. 69 There is a dearth of Maryland case law on the duty of an
164. 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
165. Id. at 1156.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Blockston v. United States, 278 F. Supp. 576 (D. Md. 1968); Crockett v. Crothers,
264 Md. 222, 285 A.2d 612 (1972).
169. A situation in which no such contract will be implied is when an employee's
injury is the result of the joint wrongdoing of his employer and a third party. In
such a case, there is a split of authority as to whether the third party may seek
indemnity or contribution from the employer based on his active wrong, since the
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actively negligent tortfeasor to indemnify one who is only passively
negligent; however, several cases have recognized the principle. The
early case of C & 0 Canal Co. v. County Commissioners,170 was a
suit for indemnification by Allegany County to recover damages
paid by the county to a person injured while crossing a defectively
constructed bridge. The bridge had originally been constructed by
the C & 0 Canal Company to replace a portion of the road it had
removed, and the company was under a duty to keep the bridge in
repair. The county had been held liable to the injured pedestrian for
breach of its common law duty to maintain public roads. In the
indemnity action by the county, the court found that both parties
had breached a duty owed to the injured party but that the county
and C & 0 were not in pari delicto. The court held that where two
parties are not equally responsible for injury caused to a third, the
principal delinquent may be held solely liable for the joint offense. In
a later case 171 the court clarified the active-passive negligence
dichotomy:
The rule to be applied to the many conditions of fact arising
in such cases is stated as follows, with accuracy and
clearness, in Gray v. Boston Gas Light Company, 114 Mass.
152, 19 Am. Rep. 324: "When two parties acting together,
commit an illegal or wrongful act, the party who is held
responsible in damages for the act cannot have indemnity or
contribution from the other, because both are equally
culpable, or participes criminis, and the damage results from
their joint offense. This rule does not apply when one does
the act or creates the nuisance, and the other does not join
therein, but is thereby exposed to liability and suffers
damage. He may recover from the party whose wrongful act
has thus exposed him. In such case the parties are not in
employee may not sue the employer under the exclusive liability provisions of the
workmen's compensation act. Compare White v. Texas Eastern Transmission
Corp., 512 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1975) and Myers v. McCarthy, 428 F. Supp. 656 (E.D.
Pa. 1977) (both cases holding that since employer statutorily immune from action
in tort by employee, no basis for contribution or indemnity in tort) with Cargill v.
United States, 1977 A.M.C. 50 (E.D. Va. 1976); Brkaric v. Star Iran & Steel Co.,
1976 A.M.C. 1572 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) and cases cited in Note, Workman's
Compensation Third Party Tort-Feasor Actions, 16 DRAKE L. REV. 93 (1967)
(cases holding employer may be held liable for contribution or indemnity despite
fact that employee cannot maintain action against employer).
The Maryland Court of Appeals has not yet considered this point. A recent
Florida case interpreted a workmen's compensation act similar to Maryland's:
The Florida statute had been construed to bar a manufacturer's third party
action against an employer. The Supreme Court of Florida found the statute so
construed to be unconstitutional as applied, and held that the statute denied
equal protection of the laws and access to the courts. Sunspan Eng'r & Constr.
Co. v. Spring-Lock Scaffolding Co., 310 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1975).
170. 57 Md. 201 (1881).
171. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. County Comm'rs, 113 Md. 404, 77 A. 930 (1910).
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pari delicto as to each other, though as to third persons
either may be held liable.'
172
There is a great deal of difficulty in applying the active-passive
negligence distinction for purposes of determining indemnity, since
the courts are not clear on what is "active" and what is "passive"
negligence. The Pennsylvania case of Builders Supply Co. v.
McCabe,173 neatly categorized the situations giving rise to passive
negligence as follows:
[T]he important point to be noted in all the cases is that
secondary as distinguished from primary liability rests upon
a fault that is imputed or constructive only, being based on
some legal relation between the parties, or arising from some
positive rule of common or statutory law or because of a
failure to discover or correct a defect or remedy a dangerous
condition caused by the act of one primarily responsible.
174
Another court has defined passive negligence in the following
manner:
[I]f the tortious conduct of the wrongdoer, regardless of the
underlying theory of liability, doe nothing more than
furnish a condition to which a subsequent independent 'act'
of a co-wrongdoer occurs, the tort feasors are not in pari
delicto and indemnity may be allowed.
175
No Maryland case has expressly considered the active-passive
negligence distinction in a product liability context; however, in
Southern Maryland Oil Co. v. Texas Co.,1 76 the court confronted a
172. Id. at 415, 77 A. at 993.
173. 366 Pa. 322, 77 A.2d 368 (1951).
174. Id. at 326, 77 A.2d at 371. Liability for passive negligence based on a legal
relation between the parties is illustrated by the situation in which a general
contractor is held liable to the employee of a sub-contractor injured on the jobsite
because of his duty to provide a safe working site, even though the sub-contractor
caused the dangerous condition. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Empire City
Iron Works, 7 App. Div. 2d 1012, 184 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1959). Indemnity is allowed
when liability is based on a rule of statutory law. Adler's Quality Bakery, Inc. v.
Gaseteria, Inc., 32 N.J. 55, 159 A.2d 97 (1960) (statute made aircraft owners
absolutely liable for ground damage caused by aircraft; court authorized
indemnity from one allegedly solely responsible for losses). In Smith Radio
Communications, Inc. v. Challenger Equip., Ltd., 270 Or. 322, 527 P.2d 711
(1974), the Oregon Supreme Court held that a retailer who receives goods from
the manufacturer, does not cause any defect in the goods, and then delivers the
goods to a customer is merely passively negligent and, thus, entitled to
indemnity from the manufacturer.
175. Automobile Club Ins. Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, 166 Mont. 221, 226, 531 P.2d
1337, 1340 (1975).
176. 203 F. Supp. 449 (D. Md. 1962).
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situation where the retailer of contaminated kerosene brought an
action for indemnity against his seller, seeking to recover damages
the retailer suffered as a result of liability to third parties. The
retailer had settled personal injury and death claims arising out of
explosions of the contaminated kerosene upon resale and use by its
customers. While the disposition of Southern Maryland turned on a
limitations problem, 7 7 the court impliedly recognized the right of the
retailer to proceed against his seller for indemnity, where the
retailer's only breach of duty to the injured party was a failure to
discover a defect in the product supplied by his seller. In Jennings v.
United States,178 a case not involving product liability, the court
made the following statement to illustrate the right to indemnity
existing between an actively and passively negligent tortfeasor:
A right to indemnity is commonly recognized where,
although both parties are negligent, the negligence of the
indemnitee is considered not as serious as that of the
indemnitor; for example, where the indemnitee's negligence
is based upon a failure to inspect and thereby discover a
defect in an article manufactured by the indemnitor.
179
Extra-jurisdictional law illustrating the active-passive negli-
gence theory of indemnity in product liability suits is abundant, and
several uniform principles can be distilled from the cases. One
general rule is that a seller who delivers defective goods to his
customer, without changing or altering them in any way, is only
passively negligent or secondarily liable for his failure to inspect,
and is entitled to indemnity from his supplier for any damage caused
by the defective product.8 0 When, however, the failure to inspect is
combined with more culpable conduct such as actual knowledge of a
problem or failure to inspect and repair prior to the injury, the seller
may be found actively negligent and denied indemnity from his
supplier.'8 ' A consumer or user of a dangerously defective product
177. See note 156 supra.
178. 374 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1967).
179. Id. at 987 n.7 (emphasis added).
180. Woods v. Juvenile Shoe Corp., 361 S.W.2d 694 (Mo. 1962); Ruping v. Great Atl. &
Pac. Tea Co., 283 App. Div. 204, 126 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1953); Amantia v. General
Motors Corp., 155 N.Y.S.2d 294 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Smith Radio Communications,
Inc. v. Challenger Equip., Ltd., 270 Or. 322, 527 P.2d 711 (1974).
181. Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co., 320 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1963). In Duckworth, a car
dealer sought indemnity from the auto manufacturer for liability to a buyer
because of personal injuries caused by a defective steering assembly. The
purchaser had directed the dealer's attention to the failure of the steering
mechanism to operate properly. The dealer examined it and advised the




that causes injury to a third person is entitled to indemnity from his
supplier unless the user was himself guilty of an active wrong.
1 8 2
Thus a user of a negligently loaded rifle that injured a third party
could not recover from the rifle manufacturer even though the
firearm was negligently manufactured.1 8 3 The defect in the weapon
and the improper handling by the user were joint causes of the
injury, and the user was not blameless as compared to the
manufacturer. When both parties are guilty of active negligence,
indemnity will be denied, and contribution, the second burden-
shifting device, is the proper avenue of relief.
The third situation in which indemnity may be employed occurs
when there is a single warranty running through the distributive
chain linking all defendants; under such circumstances, liability
may generally be "bumped up" the chain until it comes to rest with
the initial distributor. 8 4 In any sale of goods, whether the sale be
from manufacturer to distributor, distributor to retailer, or retailer to
consumer, there is an implied warranty that the goods are
merchantable.18 5 A breach of warranty by the manufacturer in its
initial sale to its distributor will result in a similar breach by each
party in the distributive chain as it passes along the unmerchanta-
ble product. A party at the far end of the distributive chain, while
liable to its immediate purchaser for breach of warranty, may pass
the liability back up the chain to the seller initially responsible for
rendering the goods unmerchantable. The general rule was well
stated in Williams v. Stewart Motor Co.,' 8 6 in which both the
manufacturer of a car and the seller breached implied warranties of
merchantability, but the dealer was given indemnity on its cross
claim against the manufacturer:
182. Gray Line Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 280 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1960); Allied
Mut. Cas. Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 279 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1960); J.C.
Penney Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 217 Cal. App. 2d 834, 32 Cal. Rptr. 172
(1963); Otis Elevator Co. v. Cameron, 205 S.W. 852 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
183. Schuster v. Steedley, 406 S.W.2d 387 (Ky. 1966).
184. 3A L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 44.03[1] (1976). Section
2-607(3)(a) of the Maryland Commercial Code and the U.C.C. requires that a
buyer give notice to his seller of breach of warranty within a reasonable time in
order to hold the seller liable for breach of warranty. In Frericks v. General
Motors Corp., 278 Md. 304, 315-16, 363 A.2d 460, 466 (1976), however, the
Maryland Court of Appeals held that the notice requirement need not be
complied with by third party beneficiaries of the warranty. In Eaton Corp. v.
Wright, 281 Md. 80, 375 A.2d 1122 (1977), the court expressly left open the
question of whether an intermediate seller who is sued for breach of warranty in
a personal injury indemnity action is required to notify his seller of the alleged
breach of warranty prior to bringing suit.
185. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 2-314 (1975). A warranty will be implied only when
the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of the kind sold. As a practical
matter, this requirement will always be met by members of the initial
distributive chain.
186. 494 F.2d 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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"Ordinarily a dealer may recover from the manufacturer
losses occasioned by the latter's breach of warranty, and the
present case poses no exception. Clearly [the dealer's] breach
of warranty to plaintiff rested on [the manufacturer's]
breach of warranty to [the dealer]."'
187
In Klages v. General Ordinance Corp.,188 the manufacturer of a mace
pen distributed leaflets containing false representations about its
product to a retailer, who in turn supplied the same leaflets to a
consumer. The consumer sued both the manufacturer and the
retailer for breach of express warranties contained in the promo-
tional literature and recovered a judgment against each. The court
allowed the retailer indemnity over against the manufacturer,
reasoning as follows:
[W]hen the retailer does not give the consumer a separate
and independent express warranty, and when the manufac-
turer gives an identical express warranty to both the retailer
and consumer, the liability of the manufacturer and retailer
is identical. If the consumer is successful in asserting breach
of express warranty against the retailer, therefore, the
retailer would likewise be successful against the manufac-
turer. In such cases, an instruction as to "liability over" is
proper.
8 9
The seller entitled to indemnity arising out of breach of
warranty may himself be a manufacturer in cases where a
component part supplier has delivered a defective product. 90 For
example, in Herman v. General Irrigation Co.,19' the manufacturer
of a central irrigation system, and the manufacturer of a diesel
engine incorporated as a component part of the system, were joined
as defendants in an action for breach of warranty. Both were held
liable to the plaintiff for passing along the defective product, which
eventually caused the injury. The manufacturer, however, of the
system was granted indemnity against the component part manu-
facturer upon proof that the defect was present in the component
part upon delivery to the system manufacturer, and that the seller
had not altered the product before delivery to the plaintiff. Eaton
Corp. v. Wright'92 involved an attempt by a manufacturer to recover
187. Id. at 1084.
188. 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 356, 367 A.2d 304 (1976).
189. Id. at 368-69, 367 A.2d at 314.
190. Fargo Machine & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364 (E.D.
Mich. 1977); Eaton Corp. v. Wright, 281 Md. 80, 375 A.2d 1122 (1977); Herman v.
General Irrigation Co., 247 N.W.2d 472 (N.D. 1976).
191. 247 N.W.2d 472 (N.D. 1976).
192. 281 Md. 80, 375 A.2d 1122 (1977).
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indemnity from the supplier of a component part for damages
suffered as a result of liability to a party injured by a defective fuel
cannister. The manufacturer attempted to shift responsibility to the
component part supplier by alleging that the supplier had breached
its implied warranty of merchantability with respect to the
component part. The Maryland Court of Appeals denied indemnity,
noting that the manufacturer had failed to show that the component
part had a causative link with the product's malfunctions.
The active negligence of one seeking indemnity which contrib-
utes as a proximate cause of the injury will bar recovery. 93 In
Automobile Club Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales,194 a driver's insurance
company brought an action for indemnity against the manufacturer
of an automobile after the driver, as well as the manufacturer, had
been held liable for the wrongful death of a third party. The court
held that a claim for indemnity based upon warranty was barred by
the finding of the driver's active negligence, which was a proximate
cause of the injuries.
The Uniform Commercial Code provides that a buyer who is
sued for breach of warranty by his sub-purchaser may give his seller
written notice of the litigation and request him to come in and
defend.19 5 This practice is termed "vouching in." Failure to defend
will result in the seller being bound by the facts developed in the
litigation between buyer and sub-purchaser, if the notice to defend
contains a statement of the consequences of such failure. 196 This
procedure does not establish a right to indemnity or contribution, in
and of itself, and a separate action must be brought to secure such a
remedy. Therefore, a buyer sued by a third party in a breach of
warranty action should always attempt to join his seller as a party
to the litigation, and thus settle any right to indemnity or
contribution in the primary suit, without need for further litigation.
The final situation in which indemnity might be applicable is
when the underlying theory of indemnification is strict liability in
tort, and the potential indemnitor is initially responsible for placing
the defective product in the stream of commerce. There is little
difficulty in granting indemnity in situations in which the
indemnitee is himself strictly liable in tort and guilty of no wrong
except passing along an unreasonably dangerous product to a
193. O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 6 Ariz. App. 122, 430 P.2d 701 (1967) (judgment against
manufacturer in favor of both seller and installer of steering mechanism for boat
reversed because of evidence that installer actively negligent, thereby creating
question for jury); Gengler v. Hendrick, 112 Ill. App. 2d 245, 251 N.E.2d 69 (1969)
(judgment for plaintiff against owner/operator and in favor of truck manufac-
turer and brake manufacturer affirmed when truck owner/operator actively
negligent in repairing truck's brakes).
194. 166 Mont. 221, 531 P.2d 1337 (1975).




subsequent link in the distributive chain.1 97 Each party has an
action over against his immediate seller until the ultimate loss has
been shifted back to the manufacturer or the party initially
responsible for putting the defective product in the stream of trade.
The proposed Restatement rule198 would allow indemnity under such
circumstances, and a comment to the rule provides as follows:
(g) The supplier of a defective chattel is required to
indemnify a retailer regardless of whether his tort liability is
based on negligence or strict liability, so long as the retailer
has failed to discover the defect before selling the product. If
he has discovered the defect and sold the product anyway,
he is not entitled to indemnity.' 99
A problem develops with granting indemnification on a strict
liability theory when the potential indemnitee is himself actively
negligent and such negligence is a proximate cause of the injury.
There is a split of authority on this question, Maryland being among
the vast majority of jurisdictions which have not yet considered the
question."
Only one jurisdiction, Illinois, has allowed an actively negligent
tortfeasor to recover indemnity from one strictly liable in tort. In
Suvada v. White Motor Co.,201 the owners of a tractor brought suit
against the manufacturer of the tractor and against the manufac-
turer of the braking system to recover the costs of settling injury
claims with bus passengers injured in a collision with the tractor,
caused by a defect in the braking system of the tractor. The court as
a matter of law, prevented him from seeking indemnity from one
197. See, e.g., Hales v. Green Colonial, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 738 (W.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd
sub nom., Hales v. Monroe, 544 F.2d 331 (8th Cir. 1976); Frisch v. Int'l Harvester
Co., 33 Ill. App. 3d 507, 338 N.E.2d 90 (1975); Tweedy v. Wright Ford Sales, Inc.,
31 111. App. 3d 72, 334 N.E.2d 417 (1975); Texaco, Inc. v. McGrew Lumber Co., 117
Ill. App. 2d 351, 254 N.E.2d 584 (1969).
198. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886(B) (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972) provides as
follows:
(1) If two persons are liable in tort to a third person for the same harm,
and one of them discharges the liability of both, he is entitled to
indemnity from the other if the other would be unjustly enriched at his
expense by the discharge of liability.
(2) Instances in which indemnity is granted under this principal
include the following:
(d) The indemnitor supplied a defective chattel or performed defective
work upon land or buildings as a result of which both were liable to the
third person and the indemnitee innocently or negligently failed to
discover the defect.
199. Id., Explanatory Notes § 886(B)(2)(d), comment g.
200. See also Note, Another Look at Strict Liability: The Effect on Contribution
Among Tortfeasors, 79 DICK. L. REV. 125 (1974).
201. 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
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strictly liable in tort.20 2 In several later cases the Illinois courts
applied and refined the Suvada doctrine.
In Texaco, Inc. v. McGrew Lumber Co.,2 03 the court was faced
with a situation very similar to that presented in Suvada. A party
who had erected a scaffold had settled a suit brought by a workman
who was injured when he fell from the scaffold as a result of a plank
breaking. The negligent parties were successful in obtaining
indemnity from the supplier of the plank based on strict liability.
The court noted that strict liability in tort is "intended to eliminate
the fault weighing process of active-passive negligence in determin-
ing any grant of indemnity relief, '20 4 and that there is "a strong
public policy that insists upon the distribution of the economic
burden in the most socially desirable manner, even to the extent of
ignoring the indemnitee's fault.
'20 5
In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Williams Machine & Tool
Co.,2°6 a manufacturer's insurer brought an action in strict liability
against the manufacturer of a defective component part, seeking
reimbursement of money paid to third parties who had been injured
when the product malfunctioned. The defendant argued that the
plaintiff was guilty of active negligence, which was a concurrent
cause of the accident, and, therefore, barred from indemnity in a
strict liability action just as it would have been in a negligence
action. In denying the defendant's contention, the Illinois Supreme
Court stated:
The major purpose of strict liability is to place the loss
caused by defective products on those who create the risk
and reap the profit by placing a defective product in the
stream of commerce, regardless of whether the defect
resulted from the "negligence" of the manufacturer. We
believe that this purpose is best accomplished by eliminat-
ing negligence as an element of any strict liability action,
including indemnity actions in which the parties are all
manufacturers or sellers of the product. As one authority has
observed: "In many jurisdictions, the right of contribution
between joint tortfeasors is denied if they are at equal fault,
but not denied if the tortfeasor seeking contribution was
only passively negligent. The difficulty of applying this test
to strict liability cases is that negligence is irrelevant for
determining liability. It is a liability based upon the placing
into commerce of a product which if defective, is likely to be
unreasonably dangerous under normal use. There is there-
202. Id. at 624, 210 N.E.2d at 188.
203. 117 Ill. App. 2d 351, 254 N.E.2d 584 (1969).
204. Id. at 357, 254 N.E.2d at 588.
205. Id.
206. 62 Ill. 2d 77, 338 N.E.2d 857 (1975).
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fore no reason why the responsibility should not trace back
to the originally responsible party .... ,,207
While holding that active negligence would not bar a plaintiff from
recovering indemnity on a strict liability in tort theory, the court did
hold that misuse or assumption of risk would act as such a bar.2° 8
In Stevens v. Silver Manufacturing Co.,209 a 1976 case, an
injured employee brought a strict liability suit against the manufac-
turer of a shredding machine, alleging that the product was in an
unreasonably dangerous condition when it left the manufacturer's
control. The manufacturer filed a third party claim against the
employer seeking indemnification, on the grounds that the employer
negligently or recklessly failed to instruct as to proper use, failed to
supervise the work properly, and allowed certain hazardous work
practices. The court denied indemnity to the strictly liable manufac-
turer "since actions founded on strict liability for defective and
unreasonably dangerous products are outside the active-passive
theory of indemnity, ' 210 and held that "third party actions for
indemnity against a subsequent user are not maintainable by the
manufacturer or seller of the defective product. '211
The other jurisdictions which have considered the question have
taken a position opposite to that of the Illinois courts, and have
refused indemnity to one actively negligent. 212 The leading case is
Northwestern Mutual Insurance Co. v. Stromme,21 3 which involved a
strict liability indemnity claim against an auto manufacturer by the
operator of the auto, who had struck and killed a construction
laborer and had been found negligent in an earlier action. The
Washington Court of Appeals denied indemnity on the following
rationale:
Washington's recent adoption of strict liability as a
basis for tort action against a manufacturer does not, of
itself, raise the tort feasor's liability thereunder to a higher
plateau or degree than the user's liability which stems from
the use of the product causing the injury; nor does it change
our indemnity laws pertaining to joint tort feasors. The facts
surrounding the incident giving rise to the initial cause of
action and the duties breached by the tort feasors determine
207. Id. at 82, 338 N.E.2d at 860 (citations omitted).
208. Id.
209. 41 Ill. App. 3d 483, 355 N.E.2d 145 (1976).
210. Id. at 487, 355 N.E.2d at 150.
211. Id. at 487-88, 355 N.E.2d at 150.
212. See, e.g., Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 50 Cal. App. 2d 49, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 852 (1975). Courts in Washington and Louisiana have also adopted a view
opposite to that of the Illinois courts.
213. 4 Wash. App. 85, 479 P.2d 554 (1971).
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whether indemnity will be permitted, not the theory upon
which their liability may be based.21
4
The Northwestern court found that the test to be applied in
indemnity actions, even those sounding in strict liability in tort, is
the old active-passive negligence theory. Thus, one strictly liable in
tort does not become obligated to indemnify a subsequent user or
seller of the product, who is himself guilty of an active wrong.
A Louisiana decision, Trahan v. Highlands Insurance Co.,2 15
likewise refused to follow the Illinois cases. In Trahan, the widow of
a derrick man, fatally injured in a fall from a derrick, brought an
action against his employer and the manufacturer of the derrick. A
verdict for the plaintiff was returned on a finding that the accident
occurred as a result of the joint negligence of the employer and the
derrick manufacturer, a cross claim for indemnity by the employer
against the manufacturer was denied. The court reasoned that the
employer was found responsbile in damages to the employee's widow
because of its own independent acts of negligence, and not because
of a defect in the derrick created by the manufacturer. This being so,
the damages which the employer sought to obtain by way of
indemnification from the manufacturer did not arise as a result of
the defect, and therefore, there was no right to indemnity.
In two interesting cases, Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Gonzales216 and
Mixter v. Mack Trucks, Inc.,21 7 a strictly liable defendant attempted
to collect indemnity from one actively negligent. In Gonzales, a drug
manufacturer was held strictly liable in tort for injuries suffered by a
patient when one of the company's drugs was administered in large
doses. The attending physician was found negligent in his treatment
of the patient. The manufacturer contended that it was entitled to
indemnity from the physician, arguing that the physician's
negligence was active, while its fault was merely passive. The court
rejected the characterization of the strictly liable manufacturer's
conduct as passively negligent, but appeared to apply the active-
passive fault test for purposes of determining the right to indemnity.
The court found both the strictly liable manufacturer and the
physician to be guilty of active wrongs and in pari delicto and thus
denied all right to indemnity. In Mixter, a judgment was entered
against the seller of a tractor on a strict liability theory and against
the installer of tubes and tires on a negligence theory, in favor of a
buyer injured when the tire exploded. On a cross claim, the court
granted indemnification in favor of the tractor seller and against the
installer on the theory that the latter had engaged in active
negligence in improperly installing the tires, and that the former
214. Id. at 88, 479 P.2d at 556 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).
215. 343 So. 2d 1163 (La. App. 1977).
216. 548 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
217. 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 313, 308 A.2d 139 (1973).
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had been merely passively negligent in failing to discover the
defective installation. Both cases are interesting because they
appear to follow the Northwestern case and apply the active-passive
negligence test, even when the liability of one party or the other rests
on strict liability in tort.
The stronger position denies indemnity to one actively negligent
from one strictly liable. Although the major purpose of strict liability
may be "to place the loss caused by defective products on those who
create the risk and reap the profit by placing a defective product in
the stream of commerce, 218 such purpose is not served by placing
losses attributable to independent, negligent acts of third parties
upon the product sponsor. An alternative to indemnity exists that
would allow preservation of the purpose of strict liability, and yet
avoid the inequitable result of a manufacturer bearing responsibility
for another man's negligence. That alternative is to apply the
traditional active-passive negligence test, and to grant indemnity
only in situations where the parties are not in pari delicto. In other
situations, contribution between the parties may be granted.
B. Contribution
The Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act 219 estab-
lishes the right to contribution among joint tort-feasors. The act
defines the term "joint tort-feasors" as "two or more persons jointly
or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or
property. ' 220 As noted before, the distinction between contribution
and indemnity as fault shifting mechanisms is that the former
operates to apportion the loss among all responsible parties, while
the latter operates to shift the entire burden from the shoulders of
one to another. It is obvious that indemnity is the preferable tool to
distribute loss, but in many situations indemnity will not be
available and contribution may be a helpful tool. Product liability
cases do not lend themselves to easy application of the contribution
mechanism because most cases involve a product defect created by a
manufacturer and undiscovered by subsequent distributors until the
time of injury. Those distributors who merely pass along a product
without altering it and without discovering the defect, although
liable for the injury, are entitled to indemnity against the party who
initially created the defect.
But what of the situation where the defective product alone
would not have caused the injury but did so only in combination
with the negligent conduct of a second member of the distributive
chain? In such a situation, a claim for contribution by one member
218. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams Machine & Tool Co., 62 Ill. 2d 77, 82, 338 N.E.2d
857, 860 (1975).
219. MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, §§ 16-22 (1972).
220. Id. § 16.
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of the chain against another will operate to reduce, but not
eliminate, the judgment burden. For example, in Bristol-Myers Co. v.
Gonzales,221 the court disallowed a claim for indemnity by one
strictly liable for production of defective goods against one actively
negligent in the use of the product causing injury to a third person.
While the court found the parties at equal fault, the strictly liable
manufacturer was not denied all relief, but instead was granted
contribution. The lesson to be learned from the foregoing discussion
is that defendants seeking to shift the judgment burden should
always plead in the alternative both indemnity and contribution.
VII. CONCLUSION
The product litigation explosion in recent years demanded that
alternate theories of recovery be developed in order adequately to
protect the rights of the consuming public. The original product
theory of negligence, which focused on the defendant's culpable
conduct, did not provide the requisite degree of protection, since
nonculpable injury-causing conduct could not be made the basis of a
recovery. Causes of action premised on strict liability and warranty
developed to fill this gap, the focus under these theories being on the
condition of the product, and not the conduct of the defendant.
Practically speaking, plaintiff gains nothing under a negligence
theory that is not also provided for by a cause of action sounding in
warranty or strict liability, and warranty and strict liability are
themselves virtually coextensive theories of recovery. In view of
these factors, judicial merger of the presently available causes of
action into a single basic product cause of action might be
procedurally beneficial, and might be of great assistance in
rendering a product action more understandable to a jury at the
instruction stage.
222
Efforts to protect the consumer have also resulted in a stripping
of technical defenses from a product lawsuit. The distributive chain
now must defend by marshalling evidence that either directly
supports the integrity of the product on trial, or attacks the
plaintiffs right to recovery because of injury-causing conduct
attributable to the plaintiff or another defendant. The stripping of
technical defenses in product litigation and the pro-consumer stance
of today's courts yields a greater potential liability for product
defendants. The high degree of exposure to potential liability makes
it imperative that product defendants attempt to shift the judgment
burden by employing either the indemnification or contribution
mechanism.
221. 548 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
222. See, e.g., Scheller v. Wilson Certified Foods, Inc., 114 Ariz. 159, 559 P.2d 1074
(case law in Arizona has merged implied warranty theory of liability into
doctrine of strict liability).
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